Corporatist Theory and Ideology: A Latin American Development Paradigm

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"What is not in the [North] American tradition but is very deeply embedded in the Portuguese and South American tradition is the corporate organization of society." So wrote Marie R. Madden in 1941.[1]

Corporatism, until recently, had been widely dismissed as both anachronistic and irrelevant. Corporatism was viewed as a product of the period between the two world wars of this century whose time had passed. Discredited by the outcome of World War II, by the Nuremberg trials, and by its supposed affinities with fascism, corporatism as an ideology and form of sociopolitical organization seemed, for a time, to have been erased and forgotten as one of the major alternative "isms" of the twentieth century. Based largely on the Italian and German experiences, corporatism was seen either as a *post hoc* rationalization that had little to do with the real locus of power or as a "confidence trick." Because the manifestly corporatist experiments in Iberia and Latin America were never fully implemented

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1. Letter to *New York Times,* 7 August 1941, written in response to a series of articles in the *New York Times* on Latin American corporatism. Madden is the author of *Political Theory and Law in Medieval Spain* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1930).

and few regimes called themselves "corporatist," the tendency has been either to dismiss corporatism as mere window dressing or to disregard it altogether as a philosophy and form of national organization whose historical epoch had been superseded.[2]

Such judgments regarding corporatism's alleged passing and irrelevance are premature and ill-founded. Corporatist ideology and sociopolitical structure are clearly not anachronistic. They manifest continued strength throughout the Iberic-Latin culture area and elsewhere, not just in the traditional regimes but in such diversely modernizing nations as Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. In many respects indeed corporatism remains the dominant mentality and form of sociopolitical organization throughout the Iberic-Latin world and is at the base of its political culture and history. Furthermore, corporatism is not irrelevant; its functions are many and diverse. It has provided the ideological bases for many contemporary movements and regimes; more profoundly, it forms an integral part of Iberic-Latin political culture and tradition with roots deep in the past. Corporatism has served as both an agency of change and of control, a twentieth century adaptation of a prevailing historic model and developmental pattern. Distinct from fascism, corporatism may be viewed as an Iberic-Latin counterpart to the other "great isms" of liberalism and Marxism, a particularly, although not exclusively, southern European and Latin American response and alternative to the problems of emerging capitalism, anomie, alienation, and mass society. Surely if one takes liberalism and Marxism seriously, if one sees John Locke at the heart of the North American tradition and Marxism-Leninism at the heart of the communist one, then one is also obliged to examine corporatism and its chief advocates in Iberia and Latin America in the same scholarly light.[3]

2. See Philippe C. Schmitter, *Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975); and Ronald C. Newton, "The Corporate Idea and the Authoritarian Tradition in Spain and Spanish America" (Paper delivered at the Fourth Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Madison, Wis., May, 1973).

3. The main literature includes Kenneth Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974); Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); and Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977).

It is the purpose of this article to trace the history of corporatist thought and ideology, to present an ideal-typical model of the modern corporatist political society, and to offer some comments on the taxonomy and praxis of corporatism.[4] Despite the generally recognized importance of corporatism, it remains a tradition of thought that is wholly neglected in the histories of political theory, anthologies on social change, and studies of developmental alternatives. Even Latin Americanists have seldom given it much attention since, it may be speculated, corporatism's assumptions often run counter to prevailing liberal beliefs and since it does not always fit into established categories.[5] Corporatism is, however, a tradition that is crucial for understanding Iberia and Latin America and with which one must come to grips if he is to comprehend the nations of this culture area on their own terms rather than through the biased, often ethnocentric perspectives of North American social science.

The Historic Tradition of Corporatism: Origins and Antecedents

A crucial distinction must be made initially between the manifestly formal-institutional corporative experiments of the 1920s and 1930s and the sociocultural tradition of corporatism which has a far longer history. The corporatist experiments of the inter-war period involved the drafting of new, manifestly corporatist constitutions such as that of Portugal in 1933 or Brazil in 1937; the establishment of functionally representative (in whole or in part) legislative bodies and councils of state; the restructuring of worker-employer relations along corporatist lines, including the frequent creation of official, monopolistic syndicates for each with the state's enforcing the corporatist principle of class cooperation; and the organization of official agencies of economic coordination and regulation, or corporations (hence the term "corporatism"), designed to restructure national social and economic life. Some of the corporative legislation never went into effect, and much of it was implemented unevenly. But there

4. This article focuses on the theory and ideology of corporatism; treatments of its sociopolitical dynamics may be found in Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics* 25 (January 1973): 206-35, and "The Corporative Origins of the Iberian and Latin American Labor Relations Systems," *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 13 (1978).

5. None of the standard English-language works on Latin American political thought, such as those by Crawford, Davis, and Jorrín and Martz, devotes much attention to corporatism.

is another sense or meaning of corporatism that has come to be used to refer to an historic pattern of sociopolitical organization—authoritarian, elitist, hierarchical, patrimonialist, and corporatist—and that seems to form an important part of Iberic-Latin political culture. In this latter, broader sense the nations of Iberia and Latin America may be a part of a general "corporatist tradition" whether or not they adopted the more manifest corporatist institutions of the inter-war period.[6]

These two meanings have frequently been confused in the literature. For example, some scholars call Brazil a patrimonialist-corporatist nation in the political-cultural sense, while others, using the institutional definition that gained prominence in the 1930s, dismiss the notion that Brazil is "corporatist" since its corporatist constitution never went into effect. The distinction made here helps to clarify the two senses in which Brazil may be considered corporatist. Although the two are analytically separable, the relations between these two meanings of the term should also be noted. In many ways, the manifest, institutional, corporatist experiments of the inter-war period represented twentieth-century extensions of earlier corporatist traditions, a modernized, updated way of responding to and managing new social pressures that exhibited numerous parallels with the past. Indeed what made the modern corporatist arguments and institutions so attractive was their affinity with the older corporatist tradition and the fact that under "corporatism" an existing elitist, hierarchical order could be maintained. Corporatism, in short, was an important part of Iberic-Latin political culture as well as a cultural tradition that could be manipulated for class or political advantage. Separating these two meanings of corporatism enables one also to see that, although the manifest corporatist institutions of the inter-war period may have disappeared and have been "superseded" (although now enjoying a resurgence in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and other countries), the older corporative political culture may have remained dominant, continuing to shape the Iberic-Latin nations in ways that make them distinctive. Hence corporatism both as a political-cultural tradition *and* as manifest ideology and institutions of a certain time

6. See Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations," *The Review of Politics* 36 (January 1974): 3-33, reprinted in Pike and Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism.*

period, together with the complex relations between them, command attention.[7]

Four main currents of thought and institutions—the Greco-Roman, the Christian-Thomistic, the feudal-medieval, and the Spanish-Portuguese during the era of nation-building and consolidation from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries—may be considered as critical in shaping the Iberian and Latin American corporatist tradition.

Corporatist theorists trace the origins of their ideas to ancient Greece, even to the origins of civil society in the family, clan, tribe, and organic local community. Greek philosophy and social organization generally, however, form their base points: the earliest professional associations, the notions of order and hierarchy, concepts of organic unity in state and society, society as a reflection of its "natural" corporate bodies, etc.[8]

Corporatists see the precursors of both medieval and contemporary corporative groups in the Roman structure of *colegios* and in the system of professional, military, and religious institutions. Each *colegio* had its own legal status and was monopolistic in character. The state governed the relations between them. From Rome the corporatists also took the concepts of a monistic state, the principle of the "common good," and a hierarchy of laws and group rights. Mihaïl Manoïlesco, one of corporatism's foremost modern theorists, saw it as a direct extension of the Roman system: the state as a civic and moral authority, harmony between state and society, society's organization on the basis of "natural" social and civic associations, representation by class and corporate group, etc.[9]

From Thomas Aquinas and their own national Christian traditions the corporatists took the concepts that property had a social function and should be used for the good of society as a whole,

7. The corporatist approach has occasionally, most notably by Professor Schmitter, been misrepresented with the result that it is easier then to "straw-man" it. Seen in the perspective presented here, corporatism is neither to be considered as belonging to the now discredited "national character" studies nor to be thought of as a "culturalist" explanation. Rather, corporatism is viewed as an important, albeit heretofore neglected, feature of Iberic-Latin political culture that merits serious attention; moreover, no claim is advanced that would elevate a useful, but still partial, explanation into a complete, all-encompassing one. There is need to be concerned with corporatism both as an independent variable *and* in terms of how it may be manipulated to become a dependent variable.

8. Fernando Campos, *O principio da organização corporativa através da historia; conferência realizada no Sindicato nacional dos Caixeiros do distrito de Lisboa na 7, noite de 27* (Lisbon: Nação Portuguesa, 1936); and Émile Lousse, *Organização e representação corporativas* (Lisbon: Bib. Social e Corporativa, 1959).

9. "Le génie latin dans le nouveau régime Portugais," *VI Congresso do Mundo Portugués* (Lisbon: Comissão dos Centenarios, 1940), pp. 621-39.

the theory of just price and a fair wage (set presumably by the state), the principle of a hierarchy of men, laws, and institutions, a feudal-patrimonial natural order, the idea of a state based on Christian assumptions of mutual rights and obligations, and the principle of functional social organization. Purchaser and seller and employer and employee should reap mutual advantage from their relations, which were to be governed by Christian brotherhood, not class conflict. Updated and sometimes secularized, many of these concepts still undergird the Iberic-Latin systems. Manoïlesco contended that it was the Roman statist and the Thomistic-Christian influences that were most important in shaping the corporative tradition and even that the various blends of these two largely determined the national variations among corporative states in modern times.[10]

Among feudal-medieval institutions the guild was particularly important for modern-day corporatists. The guilds helped to provide an acceptable answer to Catholic disapproval of commercial enterprise, for they were compulsory and monopolistic agencies with strict rules for admission and for regulating economic activity. The guilds implied cooperation between masters and workmen, not conflict as in the Marxian tradition, and the function of choosing one's own "class" representatives in the guild council. Membership was defined hierarchically: apprentice, journeyman, and master. The relations between these sectors were governed by mutual rights and obligations. In cooperation with the authorities the guilds settled conflicts, administered charity, lessened competition, and set prices, wages, hours, and production. The guild, along with such other corporate groups as the church, the family, and the local community, set limits on state power. These would serve as a check against tyranny and also as the representatives of their members to the state. In the modern conception, the corporative agencies were to perform the same functions, thus eliminating the need for divisive political parties and class associations.[11]

The fourth main current of thought critical to the shaping of the Iberic-Latin corporatist tradition was the political philosophy of the Spanish and Portuguese consolidation from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. During this period the model of the modern Iberic-Latin state was assembled into a

10. Ibid.; also Madden, *Political Theory and Law in Medieval Spain.*
11. Matthew H. Elbow, *French Corporative Theory, 1789-1940: A Chapter in the History of Ideas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953); Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development,* ch. 3.

coherent whole. It was based on a system of guilds, municipalities, nobles, and other corporate elements and classes fused together under the guidance and authority of the monarchy. The crown became the center of an elaborate nationwide patronage and bureaucratic system. The structure was hierarchical, authoritarian, and corporatist. Power was to be exercised paternally, and change would take place through the gradual widening of the elite as well as through the admission of new corporate units to the system, provided that they also gave service and loyalty to the monarchy. The Cortes was to be subordinate to the crown. The economy was similarly organized on a mercantilist, patrimonialist, statist basis in which wealth, position, and special privileges were awarded to the deserving in return for loyalty to the crown.[12]

By the sixteenth century these ideas had been further refined to provide a sophisticated model of modern, state-building royal authority. The state system of centralized, bureaucratic, patrimonialist authority now encompassed the colonies as well as the metropoles. The state was based on an organic and Thomistic conception, and its moral and political bases remained fused. The prevailing model was of a unified, Christian, authoritarian, and corporatist state with society based on the Thomistic-Aristotelian idea of functional social hierarchy. In an updated form this conception probably remains the dominant one today. For if Locke is at the heart of the liberal Anglo-American tradition, then Francisco Suárez may be seen as at the base of the Iberic-Latin one.[13]

Although this dominant sixteenth-century model was subsequently refined and modified, it continued to serve as the foundation on which Spain, Portugal, and their New World colonies were grounded. In the absence of the profound social revolutions in the Iberic-Latin world that one associates with the modern age, those structures remained unchanged in their essentials until the onslaught of liberalism during the nineteenth century. Even then the underlying social and economic structures remained

12. Sidney M. Greenfield, "The Patrimonial State and Patron-Client Relations in Iberia and Latin America: Sources of 'The System' in the Fifteenth Century Writings of the Infante D. Pedro of Portugal," *Occasional Papers Series,* no. 1, University of Massachusetts, Program in Latin America Studies, 1976.

13. For further elaboration, see Guenter Lewy, *Constitutionalism and Statecraft during the Golden Age of Spain: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana* (Geneva: Droz, 1960); Bernice Hamilton, *Political Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain: A Study of the Political Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); Richard Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change,* pp. 25-69.

largely unaltered, and liberalism came to represent a thin veneer superimposed upon, but not replacing, an older tradition that was corporatist and patrimonialist to its core.[14] Hence a new synthesis and updating were required, and that is precisely what the corporatist revival of the nineteenth century sought to provide.

The Three Great "Isms": Liberalism, Socialism, Corporatism

The French Revolution of 1789 had as one of its chief goals the abolition of feudal rights and privilege. Heady concepts of liberty and equality gained prominence, and by decree of 2 March 1791 the guilds of the *ancien régime* were swept away. These events also affected Spain, Portugal, and their soon-to-be-independent colonies in the New World: new and liberal constitutions were written, and corporate privilege was diminished, at least in law. In Iberia and Latin America, however, unlike the situation in France, the liberal laws were not accompanied by social revolution, with the result that the underlying landholding system, Catholic political culture, and sociopolitical relations remained, essentially feudal, hierarchical, elitist, and corporatist. There was no "wipe-out" of ancient corporatism; in many respects, instead, while overlaid with a liberal constitutional façade, the system of corporate privilege was strengthened.

During the next several decades, roughly 1820 to 1870, in both Iberia and Latin America, conflict between liberal and traditionalist forces was almost continuous. Reactionary thought was strongly present. In Portugal the traditionalists inveighed against Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Encyclopedists, urged restoration of a strong monarchy limited only by the traditional estates, and advocated the unity of church and state. In Spain a better-known school, Donoso Cortes, Jaime Balmes, Marcelino Menendez y Pelayo, and Ramiro de Maeztu, sought similarly to resurrect the former status quo, a system of order, hierarchy, and corporate privilege. A number of these thinkers, anticipating later

14. Raymundo Faoro, *Os donos do poder: formação de patronato político brasileiro* (Pôrto Alegre: Editôra Globo, 1958); Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 48 (February 1968): 37-58.

solutions, were willing to expand the system of corporate elites to include the new bourgeosie.[15]

These brief comments on the liberal and the traditionalist currents in Iberia and Latin America help to place in perspective the corporatist current, which purported to offer a middle way and thus help to resolve the almost continuous civil strife between the other two. If, as the traditionalists argued, liberalism ignored centuries of Iberian history and cultural formation, the traditionalists had ignored the major changes of their own century. Beginning in mid-century, therefore, there began to be fashioned a body of ideas which aimed at a new synthesis, seeking politically to ameliorate the old conflicts while also facing up to modern socioeconomic realities. Capitalism, industrialization, and accelerated social change had begun to have their effect, and the trend in ideas was also away from the old medievalism and toward the serious study of contemporary problems. French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and other Catholic writers started to wrestle with the same fundamental issues as did Karl Marx or Max Weber. They sought to fashion a political order consistent with the past but adapted to the new realities, a modernizing framework but distinctive from either liberalism or Marxism. This body of thought came to be called "corporatism," a tradition almost wholly ignored in North American theory books but crucial for comprehending Iberic-Latin development.

The corporatists drew upon familiar ideas: utopian socialism, P. J. Proudhon, Auguste Comte, and Emile Durkheim (especially his analysis of occupational groups). They also read the reformist ideas of C.-H. Saint-Simon and François LaFarelle, who elaborated guild schemes more adapted to the new age than to medievalism. In this way important features of traditional institutions might be retained, while new elements would be accommodated to the system.[16] The regard for order and hierarchy would be fused with the need for change. Mass man would be dealt with through agencies of class harmony, not conflict, and with structured participation rather than rootlessness and alienation. New corporative agencies would be created for the new middle and working classes, instead of their being dealt with through repression.

15. Fernando Campos, *O pensamento contra-revolucionário em Portugal (século XIX)* (Lisbon: J. Fernandes Júnior, 1931); Mark D. Warden, "Freedom and Tyranny: The Political Philosophy of Donoso Cortes" (Unpublished manuscript, 1971); Melchor Ferrer, Domingo Tejera, and José F. Acedo, *Historia del tradicionalismo español* (Seville: Ediciones Trajano, 1941); Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
16. Elbow, *French Corporative Theory.*

The crisis posed by "the social question" in mid-nineteenth-century Europe was primarily responsible for the revival of corporate thought. Representation would be determined by function (business, labor, industry, etc.) rather than through individualism and one man, one vote. The state would control the admission of new groups to the system. Hence change would come, but it would be carefully managed. The new social forces would be recognized without sacrificing past organic-corporatist institutions.[17]

By the 1860s and 1870s these ideas began to be brought together into a coherent social doctrine. Wilhelm Ketteler, bishop of Mainz, parliamentary deputy, and a long-time leader of the German Catholic social movement, was perhaps the first corporatist spokesman. In his *Liberty, Authority, and Church* (1862) and *Christianity and the Worker Question* (1864) Ketteler spoke of the evil effects of unlimited competition and social atomization and of the need to limit arbitrary power. He talked of the social responsibility of capital, a wider distribution of society's goods, and the need for a corporatist reorganization of society. He supported the new workers' associations, greater wages, and profit sharing, ideas that went beyond traditional Catholic charity. Drawing upon the long tradition of German organicist and pre-corporatist thought (G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Fichte, O. F. Gierke), he proposed a regenerated guild scheme as a solution. Ketteler's influence on two generations of young prelates, unionists, and social workers was considerable.[18]

Another important current was the French corporatist school of the Marquis La Tour du Pin, Albert de Mun, and Leon Harmel. They and Social Christians Charles Périn and Emile Keller formulated the idea of a network of organizations combining employers and employees to regulate each industry, trade, and profession. They also emphasized such "natural" corporations as the church or the family as forming the basis of the state.

17. J. M. P. da Costa, *Capitalismo, Socialismo, Corporatismo* (Lisbon: Fundação Nacional para a Alegría no Trabalho, 1958); José Joaquín Azpiazu, *The Corporative State*, trans. William Bresnahan (London, St. Louis: Herder, 1951). Implied in these comments is the fact that while corporatism was an important aspect of Iberic-Latin political culture, it could also be used for partisan or class favoritism. Franco, for example, played upon Spain's historic corporatist and authoritarian institutions and sought to elevate his particular conception of what constituted the national tradition into the only permissible one.

18. Michael S. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953* (London: Routledge; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957); Ralph Bowen, *German Theories of the Corporative State, with Special Reference to the Period 1870-1919* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947).

La Tour and de Mun formed an association of Catholic Workingmen's Circles which, after beginning in 1871, had grown to fifty thousand members in four hundred circles by 1884. The circles were directed *by* their elite leadership *for* their laboring members. The aim was not to promote independent trade unions but to place workers and employers in Christian "corporations" under the direction of executive committees recruited from the "better" classes. La Tour remained an aristocrat and monarchist, but de Mun came to see the need for independent corporatist associations of workers. Harmel shocked fellow industrialists by instigating profit sharing and independent labor unions in his factory.[19]

Other Catholic social movements, workers' associations, and farm cooperatives began springing up throughout France. Similar corporatist ideas were put forth by Baron Karl von Vogelsang in Austria, Cardinal Henry Manning in Britain, Giuseppe Maria Bosco in Italy, Kaspar Decurtins in Switzerland, Monsignor Antoine Pottier in Belgium, and James Cardinal Gibbons in the United States. A body of corporative doctrine thus began to emerge that cut across national boundaries and that purported to offer a non-Marxist answer to the ills of capitalism and liberalism. Nor were the Roman Catholic Church and Pope Leo XIII unaware of these doctrines. In 1884 La Tour met with the pope, and there is no doubt that Leo himself was strongly influenced by the corporatist ideas. By the 1880s a considerable body of corporatist writings and movements had emerged; there remained the task of bringing unity to these still vague ideas and of strengthening the organizational base.

In 1881 Pope Leo charged a commission of theologians and Catholic social thinkers with studying these issues in relation to Catholic teachings. They met at Freiburg in 1884. Corporatism was now clearly defined for the first time as a "system of social organization that has at its base the groupings of men according to the community of their natural interests and social functions, and as true and proper organs of the state they direct and coordinate labor and capital in matters of common interest." The Freiburg meeting brought together for the first time corporatist thinkers from different nations, gave their movement legitimacy and coherence, and stimulated the growth of new activities. The theses adopted at Freiburg also influenced the Vatican representatives and helped to inspire the papal encyclical, *Rerum*

19. Elbow, *French Corporative Theory*, ch. 2.

Novarum (1891). Another gathering in Berlin in 1890 under papal auspices adopted a similar corporative program on the eve of Leo XIII's promulgation of his "workingman's encyclical."

By today's standards these early movements were hardly radical, but in the context of the times (Bismarckian Germany, Restoration Spain) they did represent some new departures. Although primarily concerned with social justice, corporatism was also a response to the perceived Marxian threat. Its conservative nature was reflected in the make-up of the committee of ten that drafted the Freiburg theses: two barons, five counts, a duke, and a bishop. La Tour continued to speak of a "natural" ruling class, and the workers' associations were generally led by priests and wealthier elements who sought to provide paternalistic protection to the workers and to combat socialism. The early Catholic social movement was at most mildly reformist.

Nevertheless, the 1880s and 1890s marked a watershed in the Catholic movement. Aristocratic attitudes toward "the social question" gradually evolved. A positive conception of trade unions began to replace the negative one. The earlier Workingmen's Circles had attracted the pious and weak; now real *working class* movements began to be organized, run by the workers themselves. The older paternalism was proving to be inadequate. While collaboration between classes remained the ideal, both labor and capital had to be strong enough to defend their own interests. The workers could achieve their just demands by collective action under their own leadership. The clerical influence was reduced, and the workers' associations were no longer necessarily confessional. Independent action now included the right to strike. Clearly these new formulations still carried heavy Catholic, paternalistic overtones, but the Catholic social movement also saw the need to update its thinking so as to provide a progressive social reformism capable of competing with socialism. The trend toward independent working-class movements, however, was far stronger in France and Germany than in Spain and Portugal, where the older paternalistic conception still dominated.[20]

Rerum Novarum provided a special impetus to the growth of Catholic social and labor movements. It argued that, like the family, labor organizations were a part of the natural order. The right of men to organize and engage in trade union activities

20. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy*, chs. 15-16; Émile Lousse, *Corporativismo Antigo e Moderno* (Lisbon: Cruz, 1959); Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU; The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party* (The Hague: Nijoff, 1960).

was inherent, not to be denied by employers or the state. Property was given a social function, and worker rights were considered to be equal with those of employers. *Rerum Novarum* provided a legitimacy which the Catholic movements had not had before and elevated the laboring class to a position where its rights had to be recognized. The trade unions were given their place alongside other pillars in the corporative system. Although weakly implemented at first, until given stronger expression in *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), *Rerum Novarum* helped to inspire a host of Catholic social and workers' movements throughout Europe and Latin America.[21]

An added impetus to corporatist ideas was provided during this same pre-World War I period by the rejection of the liberal and democratic conceptions in the writings of Ludwig Gumplowicz, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Roberto Michels, and Georges Sorel. Anti-liberal, anti-parliamentary ideas were strong and widespread. All these writers criticized the egalitarian assumptions, saw society as inherently pyramidal, and emphasized the role of elites. Like the Catholic corporatists, they were organicists, and their writings emphasized group more than individual rights, posited a strong role for the state, and took up "integralist" and "solidarist" positions. They saw change as occurring from the top down with the state's exercising control over the process. These were all secular conceptions and had a strong impact on Italian Fascism. Many of their ideas, however, dovetailed with the Catholic corporatists, and their critiques of democracy, egalitarianism, and parliamentarianism were applauded. It is no accident that subsequent corporative institutions in Iberia and Latin America derived from both the secular conceptions of Benito Mussolini's *Carta del Lavoro* and the Catholic ideas of the encyclicals and that the tension also continued between their inclination toward fascism and the pull of Christian humanism.[22]

By the turn of the century a great variety of Catholic and/or corporatist workers' and social movements had sprung up. In 1895 the first national Catholic trade union federation had been founded in Germany, and by the first decade of the twentieth century similar federations had been established in a number of other European countries. In Spain and Portugal the Catholic

21. Miguel Jorrín and John D. Martz, *Latin-American Political Thought and Ideology* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 406-9.
22. A. James Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism* (New York: Free Press, 1969); Stanley Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961).

Círculos were flourishing, the *Semaines Sociales* and other Catholic study groups were spreading, and a general Catholic revival was under way. Associations for youth, women, university students, and professionals were also established, in addition to the *sindicatos* and *gremios* for workers and employers. In 1900 the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers was created; meanwhile new concepts of social security were being articulated, and a variety of Christian-democratic movements began.[23]

The author's purpose is not to discuss these movements in detail or their national variations but only to show the context in which corporatism took root and how widespread the new movement was. Of course, in most of these associations heavy stress continued to be placed on family and religion, and many existed as mutual benefit societies. Nevertheless, the changes in the Catholic social movement since the aristocratic paternalism of the 1870s were considerable. By 1900 an increasingly modern, progressive, even in some cases militant series of organizations had been established. These sought to deal with the complex issues of modern mass man, alienation, and class conflict, but in ways that would also preserve intact those institutions considered valuable from the past (religion, family, authority, community, etc.). Corporatism began to emerge as a "third way," an alternative to the other great "isms" of liberalism and Marxism.

In the peaceful, conservative decades before World War I, the Catholic social movement grew gradually. In the chaotic decade following the war, however, it grew rapidly. The social question loomed bigger, violent workers' revolts took place, and Bolshevism threatened. Socialism remained an unacceptable alternative, and with the market crash and depression of the early 1930s it seemed that capitalism and liberalism had also collapsed. In those desperate times, with no other available alternatives, corporatism, particularly, although not exclusively, in the Catholic and southern European countries, appeared to offer the only solution. In Spain under Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-30) and then Francisco Franco (1939-75), Greece under Eleutherios Venizelos (1917-20) and Joannes Metaxes (1936-41), Bulgaria and Lithuania (1926-29), Poland under Józef K. Pilsudski (1926-35),

23. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy;* Joseph Nestor Moody, ed., *Church and Society: Catholic Social Thought and Movements, 1789-1950* (New York: Arts, 1953); Richard A. H. Robinson, "The Religious Question and the Catholic Revival in Portugal, circa 1900-1930" (Paper presented at the Workshop on Modern Portugal, Durham, N. H., 10-14 October 1973).

Albania (1928-39), Yugoslavia (1929), Portugal (1926-74), Turkey, Estonia and Latvia (1934), Austria (1934-38), Ireland (1937), Romania, Vichy France, Italy (1922-45), and Germany (1933-45), either corporatist regimes came to power or governments were strongly infused with corporatist ideology.[24]

Corporatism also made strong inroads into Latin America. The chief influences were the Catholic-corporative states of Spain and Portugal, although the Italian and French influences were also present. For many Catholic writers Antonio de Oliveira Salazar's *Estado Novo,* probably the "purest" of the existing corporative systems, was viewed as a model. In the 1930s a host of regimes, movements, and parties were fashioned, in varying degrees to be sure, on the basis of corporatist influences. The "corporatist" label was not always used, and the formal-legal structure of corporatism was nowhere so complete as in Portugal, but the corporatist influence was still strongly present. The regimes and movements which borrowed concepts and institutional arrangements from corporatism include Getúlio Vargas's Brazil, Rafael Trujillo's Dominican Republic, Juan Perón's Argentina, Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, Maximiliano Hernández in El Salvador, Óscar Benavides in Peru, the Bolivian National Revolutionary movement (MNR), Peru's American Popular Revolutionary alliance (APRA), the Mexican Revolutionary Institutional party (PRI), and numerous others.[25] Corporatism seemed to be the wave of the future.

Numerous reasons help to explain the popularity of corporatism in Iberia and Latin America during this period. These include the widespread dissemination of European corporatist ideas throughout Latin America during the 1930s, the neo-Thomistic and Catholic revival, the promulgation of Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931, and Spain's aggressive *hispanismo* with its strong corporatist overtones.[26] The fact that corporatism was strongly congruent with Iberia's and Latin America's patrimonialist, natural-corporatist tradition was also important; corporatism seemed a part of the accustomed landscape. That fact that corporatism was European and seemed the wave of the future constitutes another reason for its widespread acceptance.

24. Louis Baudin, *Le Corporatisme: Italie, Portugal, Espagne, France,* rev. and augm. ed. (Paris, 1942); also the references and bibliography in Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Pike and Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism.*
25. See Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism,* and its bibliography.
26. Frederick B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971).

Related to all these factors and perhaps most important is the factor that corporatism provided a way out of the political crisis of the time without tampering unduly with Iberia's or Latin America's existing structures. The Great Depression, the collapse of oligarchic rule, and the rise of "the social question" had created both a vacuum and a need for a new formula. Corporatism filled that need without implying revolutionary upheaval. It meant a shift in the locus of power from oligarchic to middle sector rule without destroying "the system." It provided a way of absorbing the emerging workers' organizations into the prevailing structure and channeling certain benefits to them without signifying much real transfer of wealth and power. It meant a means of accommodating new power contenders in the classic Andersonian pattern but under a system of state control and regulation.[27] Corporatism also implied a shift from geographical localism to a comprehensive, national political order. It was a way to fill the historic associational vacuum, to expand state control over the economy, to correct the traditional *falta de organización,* and thus to become a modern, developed nation. For all these reasons corporatism was exceedingly attractive. It is no accident that the new labor ministries created during this period, the regulatory agencies, labor laws, trade unions, farmers' associations, etc., all showed such strong corporatist influence.[28]

After World War II the labels changed, and some of the corporatist institutional arrangements were set aside. Although baptized with new names, other corporatist institutions continued. Certainly the historic corporatist politico-cultural tradition remained alive, now rediscovered in the wake of the failure of so many of the liberal experiments of the 1960s. Furthermore, many of the Latin American nations remained corporatist, or mixed, systems de facto even if not in law or constitution. It is this tradition of thought and sociopolitical organization, long neglected or mistakenly consigned to the ashcans of history, which is critical for understanding Iberic-Latin development patterns. Prejudices concerning corporatism's alleged affinities to fascism (fascism being one form of corporatism but hardly the only one), a social science that insists that corporatism's era has already passed historically, and sometimes willful neglect because North Americans do not always appreciate the values that corporatism

27. Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations* (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1967), ch. 4.
28. Wiarda, "Corporative Origins."

enshrines should not blind them to the importance of corporatism in the Iberic-Latin tradition. It is one of the basic arguments herein that such biases should have no place in scholarly analysis, that they have frequently blinded North Americans to the distinctive character of Iberic-Latin development, and that if North Americans are to comprehend Iberia and Latin America on their own terms rather than through the sometimes ethnocentric conceptions of North American social science, North Americans must come to grips with corporatism as a past *and* continuing influence.

The Corporatist Vision of State and Society

Although the corporatist resurgence of the mid-nineteenth century had begun chiefly as a *Catholic* movement, by the turn of the century there were several major corporatist currents. These included the historic social-Christian form, a secular-nationalist form which would be exemplified by Mussolini's Italy, a reformist but "solidarist" form whose spokesmen included Emile Durkheim, and a left-syndicalist form whose ranks included Sorel and the guild socialists.[29] In the inter-war period, as various corporatist regimes came to power, new permutations and national variations appeared.

Clearly a wide spectrum of regimes and movements, and not just conservative ones, falls under the corporatist rubric. Initially in Iberia and Latin America the chief influences were the social-Christian and the etatist-authoritarian. Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and Vargas's Brazil are the major examples. In the more developed European countries, with stronger trade unions and socialist traditions, the reformist and left varieties were also present. However, as Latin America continued its development, the left and syndicalist varieties emerged there as well; for example, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, João Goulart in Brazil, and the military-nationalist regime in Peru.

Although political discourse in Latin America in the post-World War II period was usually couched in terms of the familiar liberal-conservative debate, the real struggle, it may be suggested, was between alternative corporatist conceptions. In Brazil it was the left-syndicalist position of Goulart as opposed to the authoritarian conservatism of the military; in Chile it was the social-Catholic position of the Christian Democrats, the socialist-syndicalism of Salvador Allende, and the authoritarian-gremialist position of the army; and so on. The debate was not so much

29. Schmitter, *Corporatism and Public Policy.*

between corporatism and something else as on the appropriateness of conflicting corporatist solutions. This implies that corporatism may be an ongoing characteristic, not confined to a single type of regime or historical period. It also means that corporatism is not static but dynamic and that its varied alternative forms are related to processes of social change and modernization. Putting it this way helps to illustrate how enduring and pervasive the corporatist influence, in its several forms, is in Latin America. It may also show why the "liberal" and "conservative" labels often confuse the issues more than they enlighten.

Given this heterogeneity, it is difficult to define a single set of ideas to which all corporatists subscribe. Corporatism is no longer a single "ism" but encompasses a variety of conceptions. Nevertheless, there are some common threads in these conceptions, particularly as they have been applied in Iberia and Latin America. The "ideal type" of a corporatist state and society presented here glosses over some of the differences and national variations in the interest of providing a clear, coherent picture. It emphasizes not the several branches of corporatist thought but the main trunk.[30]

Most of the voluminous writings on corporatism begin with a repudiation of its alternatives, liberalism and communism.[31] Communism is rejected for its bloody past, its totalitarian impulses, its materialism, its stress on class strife, and other reasons. Liberalism is rejected for its excessive individualism, its inorganic

30. The analysis draws upon the works of Campos, Elbow, Lousse, Azpiazu, Fogarty, Bowen, Moody, Payne, and Baudin already cited; also João de Almeida, *O estado novo* (Lisbon: Parceria A. M. Pereira, 1932); Mihaïl Manoïlesco, *Le siècle du Corporatism: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1934); Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna, *Instituções Políticas Brasileiras*, 2d rev. ed.; 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Olimpio, 1955); Maurice Bouviere-Ajam, *La doctrine corporative*, 3d ed. (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1941); Richard L. Camp, *The Papal Ideology of Social Reform: A Study in Historical Development, 1878-1967* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969); Carl T. Schmidt, *The Corporate State in Action: Italy under Fascism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939); Luiz de Cunha Gonçalves, *Causas e efeitos do corporativismo portugues* (Lisbon: Instituto Superior de Ciencias Economicas e Financeiras, 1936); João Pinto da Costa Leite, *A doutrina corporativa em Portugal* (Lisbon: Classica, 1966); Antonio C. de Almeida e Oliveira, *Principios fundamentais do estado novo corporativo* (Coimbra: Ed. Tip. Gráfica, 1937); João Manuel Cortez Pinto, *A corporação: subsídios para o seu estudo*, 2 vols. (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1955); Augusto de Morais Sarmento, *O corporativismo portugues e as postulados da sociologia Católica* (Braga: Liv. Cruz, 1964); Marcello Caetano, *O sistema corporativo* (Lisbon: Oficinas Gráficas de O Jornal de Comércio e das Colónias, 1938); Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos*, esp. vol. 1, 1928-34 (Coimba: Coimbra Editora, 1944-61); J. Silva Saraiva, *O pensamento político de Salazar* (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1953); also the references in Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" pp. 128-31.

31. Some corporatists condemned not only communism but also all forms of socialism.

conceptions of the state, its representational system based on one man, one vote, its interest group pluralism and inattention to the common good, its divisive party politics, its laissez faire economic structure, and its atomistic concepts of man and society. In the Latin American context the critique of liberalism was often more muted than in Iberia, and an attempt was made to fuse corporatism with the older republican institutions. Nevertheless, throughout the entire culture area the corporatist ideology found a fertile ground during the 1930s, given the unacceptability of communism and Iberia's and Latin America's often unhappy experiences with liberalism. The critique of liberalism was not necessarily a blanket condemnation but only of its divisive, chaotic tendencies in the Iberic-Latin context. Liberalism seemed to work in Britain and the United States, but in Iberia and Latin America, where the traditions were distinct, liberalism was viewed as inappropriate, a set of foreign institutions imposed on a culture and societies where they did not fit.

Along with the rejection of liberalism went the rejection of its institutional accouterments. The need for unity and authority was at cross purposes with checks and balances and a coequal parliament. Divisive political parties would be replaced by a single movement. Since society's interests were to be represented functionally, competitive elections were no longer necessary. Civil liberties would be respected, but they could also be limited for the common good. While these changes would likely serve to expand the power of the central state, the creation of corporate intermediary structures and the revitalization of society's natural associations (family, community, guilds, etc.) would provide for decentralization and limits on state power.[32]

Corporatist ideology was nationalist in two ways. It implied a rejection of the foreign, chiefly United States, influences implanted in Latin America contrary to its own cultural traditions, or a repudiation of moral, political, and economic dependency. It meant also a search for that which was viable in Iberia's and Latin America's own traditions on which a new nationalist sociopolitical structure could be based. Some corporatists went back to Rome for their ideal, others to a romanticized medievalism, some to the pre-Columbian Indian civilizations, and most to a blend of these together with the sixteenth-century Spanish

32. The critique of liberalism and materialism had a long history in Latin America and was not confined just to corporatists; José Enrique Rodó's *Ariel* is one well-known expression of a whole tradition of thought.

model, the guild tradition, Catholicism, and such strong Iberic-Latin institutions as the family, community, and religion. The nationalist argument was thus strengthened by a resurgence of cultural nationalism. In a sense this effort to build a new order in Iberia and Latin America upon the ruins of the old was comparable to that of the new nations today: rejecting the foreign, colonialist models of the past and seeking to discover in their own histories an indigenous framework for national development.

Repudiating the extremes of liberal individualism, the corporatists sought to reconstruct state and society on an organic basis. Attempts to function under an inorganic form, they argued, had led to chaos and civil conflict. In contrast to contract theory, corporatists saw society as natural, ordained by God and nature, and necessary for man's social and political well-being.[33] Their natural law conception implied that political society should be based on such "natural" groups as the family, the clan, the locality, etc., and not on such "unnatural" associations as political parties or interest groups. In the corporatist vision each man was to be rooted and secure in his natural station in life, whether he was an urban worker, a cleric, or a professional. Representation would also be based on such natural associations, although in practice most corporatists combined functional with politico-geographic representation. Membership in a corporate group guaranteed representation to all societal elements and enabled persons to qualify for the rights due them as members of the group.

Authority would also be required in both social affairs and government. The so-called "black box" concept of liberalism, by which government is merely the filter through which competing interests are channeled, is rejected. The role of government is to *govern,* not just to serve as a neutral referee. The state was to be a moral leader, authoritative and integral. Its role was to coordinate, regulate, prod, and stimulate national development and to regulate the relations among corporate groups. Authority hence had to be centralized and monistic rather than divided and dispersed.[34]

33. Recent research in sociobiology seems to indicate that the group conception of the organicists may be a closer approximation to reality than the individualism of contract theory.

34. These comments imply that criticisms of Iberia and Latin America for not developing a separate and coequal parliament, or judicial review, are beside the point.

But if the state was to be authoritarian, it was not totalitarian.[35] Here is where corporatism's critics have sometimes foundered, for to them it seems inconceivable that a system not based on Montesquieuian checks and balances would not become totalitarian. But the corporatist state would also be limited. It was, for example, to help to manage and regulate the economy but not completely run it; such a concept serves to explain the emergence throughout the area of state capitalist economies distinct from both laissez faire and total state ownership. The state would also be limited by the rights and *fueros* of the corporate groups that constitute society. Finally, in the Catholic conception, the state was to be limited by a higher moral law. By this the corporatists meant not pragmatism or utilitarian ethics but the eternal law which lays down immutable norms for human conduct. The state was viewed not as an end in itself but an instrument; it was obliged to recognize moral values with a greater claim to legitimacy than its own. Of course in some corporative systems (Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, Trujillo's Dominican Republic) the abuses of both corporate group rights and moral restraint were such that they verged on totalitarianism. But in other corporative systems, and even to some degree in those just mentioned, the limits on state power functioned effectively. Further, where authoritarianism, which was permissible and widely accepted, approached totalitarianism, which was unacceptable, corporatist theory as well as Thomas Aquinas provided legitimacy to the right of rebellion.

The corporatists believed that laissez faire had failed, but they could not countenance totalitarian rule. They believed that the state was obliged to accept responsibility for the national economic life but not totally to direct it. The state's role was to stimulate, regulate, and adjust the economy to serve the common good. The corporatists were not far from John Maynard Keynes on these points; indeed in many of his writings Keynes could be interpreted as advocating a corporatist solution.[36] The state was particularly obliged to encourage cooperation among classes and economic groups, to help to raise production, to approve collective contracts, and to veto exploitative economic practices. The

35. Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 291-342.
36. John Maynard Keynes, *The End of Laissez-Faire* (London: Hogarth Press, 1926), pp. 41-42; also Norman H. Keehn, "A World of Becoming: From Pluralism to Corporatism," *Polity* 9 (Fall 1976): 19-39.

state was thus given broad regulative powers, although with some limits placed upon it. These broad powers tend to account for the curious presence in the Iberic-Latin economies, which North Americans assume to be capitalistic, of public sectors roughly twice as large as that of the United States. The fact is that the Iberian and Latin American economies came increasingly, under the influence of corporatism, to take on an etatist form, with a strong role accorded to the state to regulate and manage the economy in the public interest. The corporatist influence also helps to explain the equally powerful role of the state in industrial relations. Indeed it is the conflict between the concepts of a strong but limited state and the almost irresistible tendency toward complete state power that accounts for much of the early political dynamics of corporatism and for the divergence between the more limited *corporatisme d'association* and its more fascistic form as *corporatisme d'état.*[37]

The corporatists sought to respond not only to man's economic needs but also to his moral, cultural, and social needs. This was in keeping with both their critique of Marxism *and* their hostility to capitalism. The corporatists recognized the alienation of modern mass man but argued that it was social and cultural as well as economic. Hence they aimed not just to raise wages and improve benefits but to organize people's clubs, social centers, libraries, retreats, dances, and sporting events. These represented ways of reintegrating the lower classes into society and of reforging the link between state and society. The corporative agencies were charged with implementing these functions of socialization as a way of educating, "civilizing," and incorporating the rising social forces into the system.

The individual has his place in corporatist society chiefly as a member of the groups that make up the system: church, army, trade unions, employers' groups, farmers, etc. Although the individual enjoys some fundamental human rights, his social and political rights (social security, representation) come via his corporatist association.

The state is obligated to uphold these rights, which serve as a further check on unbridled state power. The separate existence of these several associations apart from the state is what corporatists mean when they refer to theirs as a system of corporate

37. William Glade, *The Latin American Economies: A Study of Their Institutional Evolution* (New York: American Book, 1969); Wiarda, "Corporative Origins"; and Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

pluralism.[38] By pluralism they mean a system in which the rights (*fueros*) of each group are defined in law and the group enjoys both representation in the system and a contractually defined independence from the state. A state is pluralist in the corporate sense insofar as it allows and safeguards associations other than the state: municipal government, corporate associations, and the like. Some agencies like the church or the family are considered prior to the state in both natural rights and history. Organic laws or charters of autonomy, such as those governing the university or the army, are designed to promote the interests of their members *and* to protect them against the state's encroachments. The corporatists proposed to extend these rights to labor and eventually to rural workers and thus to give them legitimacy and a place in the system. A government that abridges these basic rights sacrifices its own right to continued loyalty.

These same groups formed the base on which the corporate order would be fashioned. At the grass-roots level would be the family, the municipality, *sindicatos*, local community centers, and the like. Then there would be provincial, regional, or state associations. At the cupola would stand the higher agencies of the system: functionally representative bodies, regulatory agencies, corporations, etc. The corporations might be organized vertically to encompass all those (workers, managers, employers) involved in the production of a single product, or horizontally in terms of the major branches of production (agriculture, commerce, industry, etc.). The church, army, or university would be organized into separate corporations. These associations were to evolve naturally or organically and not to be imposed; in the best of situations the state was only to give legal sanction to already existing corporations. All these groups would be represented in a corporate assembly or council of state and *in*corporated into the regulatory agencies and economic bureaus. The councils of state organized in Spain, Portugal, and several of the Latin American countries, for instance, usually included the archbishop, the heads of the armed services, the rector of the university, several ministers (labor, agriculture, commerce), and the presidents of the chief business, agricultural, and patronal groups.

Instead of "artificial" political parties and special interest

38. Philippe C. Schmitter in his "Still the Century of Corporatism?" has confused the issue by positing pluralism as the polar opposite of corporatism; in fact, corporatism may take a pluralist form, although with varying limits on group formation and activity.

groups, the corporatist system would be based on society's "natural" groupings. The corporative agencies, furthermore, were not mere agents of their private members but institutions of public interest integrated with the state. Each group was to be "institutionalized" and guaranteed its legitimate place in the system; its voice would be heard in national decision making without the corrupting influence associated with American-style interest group lobbying. This structure would serve to unify society and to ensure that government and its constituent groups worked harmoniously. The fact that the corporative agencies would be autonomous vis-à-vis the state was supposed to guard against totalitarianism.

Within each corporative agency, capital and labor were to work together harmoniously for the common good. Instead of class conflict, corporatism provided for obligatory coexistence and negotiations. Workers and employers would still have their differences, but these were to be adjusted and accommodated under state supervision. Hence both strikes and lockouts could be prohibited. The rights of workers and of employers would be respected, and these would both be represented equally in the highest agencies of the state. Various schemes of co-government and co-participation were elaborated. No one class could or would profit disproportionately; all would share in decision making and in service for the common good.

Although corporatism shared certain characteristics with fascism, the two should not necessarily be equated. The corporatist writers rejected the extreme nationalistic implications of fascism and its cult of the leader. Corporatists also rejected the antirationalist proclivities of fascism. They repudiated totalitarianism, the Nazi behemoth, and racial persecution. Whereas in Italy and Germany all associations had been subordinated to the state, in the corporatist vision these were to enjoy a separate existence. Corporatism had a long and independent history of its own, and most corporatists quickly dissociated themselves from the real fascists in their country. A condemnation of fascism, therefore, ought not to be extended into a blanket condemnation of all corporatist systems.

Corporatism grew out of the fundamental guild assumption of the unity of purpose of masters and journeymen. Corporatist historians recognized also the limitations of the guild system and repudiated its monopolistic tendencies. They argued, however, that the French Revolution had succeeded in abolishing both the

bad and the good aspects, not only the abuses of the guild principle but also the principle itself. Although favoring freedom of association, they argued that men could best realize their rights through a corporative associational life. In a period of conflict, breakdown, and societal disarray, theirs was an attractive vision.

Underlying the corporative conception was also a strong, although frequently forgotten, motive of social justice. The men who articulated the corporatist ideology were genuinely concerned with alleviating poverty and backwardness, throwing off inappropriate foreign models and designing new indigenous ones, and providing for national social, political, and economic development. The corporatist system was not just a means, as some have alleged, of preserving elitist rule and stifling the lower classes. Of course the corporatist scheme is open to a host of questions and criticisms. One can easily challenge its assumptions, its functionality, the way it was often manipulated in practice to serve not the public good but some narrower interest, whether the praxis of modern corporatism would necessarily be distinct from the medieval, the implications of corporatist-technocratic rule, etc. But at least in theory and intentions, as well as by the middle- rather than upper-class background of those who articulated and fashioned the various national systems, the corporatist conception was by no means wholly reactionary or elitist. Corporatism's powerful urge for social justice, for securing representation for new social groups, and for dealing with the great issues of alienation, mass man, and accelerated social change in a way that was less conflict-prone and more in keeping with the Iberic-Latin tradition than either liberalism or communism cannot be forgotten.

Summary and Implications

The corporatist theory and sociology presented here, which emerged as a full-blown ideology during the same epoch in which Marxist and modern-day liberal ideologies were articulated, serve as an alternative response to the same great questions of alienation, mass man, and modern industrial society. Because corporatism's roots were strongly grounded in the Catholic tradition, Roman law, and a certain northern Mediterranean tradition and ethos, it found particular, although not exclusive, receptivity in the southern European countries and the colonies which they had founded on a similar basis.

Corporatism is a tradition of social and political thought that has been almost entirely neglected in North American political theory, sociology, and development literature, but it is crucial for understanding the responses to modernization of the Iberic-Latin nations. Corporatism and the corporatist tradition are not just ideas and institutional forms of passing interest, reaching their heyday in the inter-war period and then disappearing, but instead constitute an ongoing tradition, strongly intertwined with the history and culture of the area and continuing today to influence political behavior and the structure of society and polity in a great variety of systems, both traditional (Paraguay, Nicaragua) and modernizing (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Peru), both left and right.

The corporatist influence remains strong despite the fact that few Latin American nations used that label or enacted the full gamut of corporatist institutions. Moreover, corporatism was never the exclusive pivot of Latin American political society. Nevertheless, *all* the Iberian and Latin American nations adopted some elements of corporatism, and in virtually all cases, although under different names, these continue today. In Latin America corporatist practices and institutions were frequently combined with liberal and republican forms; these fusions still exist at present. Simultaneously there were distinct national traditions in all these countries which shaped the varieties of corporatist blends. The particular form that corporatism took was also related to levels of development, class structure, and the stage and type of capitalism. None of the Latin American nations was completely corporatized in terms of the ideal model here presented, but all felt the corporatist influence at least partially. They were, in Manoïlesco's terms, not "pure" corporatist systems but "mixed" or "subordinate" ones.

The mixed nature of these systems means that the corporatist framework is by itself incapable of explaining all of Iberic-Latin social behavior. Other models, such as the dependency or class approach, must be used in conjunction with corporatism to explain the range of activity that does not fall within the corporatist framework. In addition, genuinely liberal and socialist movements have obviously made their presence felt, and some countries, however successfully, have sought to transcend their corporatist pasts. Some of these phenomena call for models of interpretation that the corporatist one does not completely provide; they also imply the utility of a conflict model which is

not given sufficient attention in the consensus framework of corporatist theory.

Corporatism was at the front and center of the sociopolitical systems of Iberia and Latin America during the 1930s, then followed a certain eclipse, perhaps more disguised than real, and now seems again resurgent. Throughout all these periods corporatism was of critical importance in some, though not all, areas of national life. It seems inconceivable, for example, that one could understand trade unionism in the Iberic-Latin systems, the structure of labor and industrial relations, social security and assistance, the organization of labor, commerce, and other ministries, the system of representation, the state's relations with its constituent groups, political economy, and numerous areas of public policy without coming to grips with corporatist theory and concepts. If one uses corporatism in the broad historical and politico-cultural sense, viewing the recent, more manifest experiments with "corporatism" as a modern-day extension of an older historic pattern, or "natural corporatism," then the corporatist framework has a utility and explanatory power for studying an even wider range of phenomena: the structure of class relations, the nature of the state system, the particular pattern of economic and social development, patron-client relations, the nature of the change process, the structure of political institutions, etc. In this way the form of corporatism presented here would seem to be closely attuned to the prevailing Iberic-Latin value system, to be a part of the *natural* politico-cultural ambience in which to a greater or lesser degree all the Iberic-Latin systems function, and to be an historic and indigenous response that often renders inapplicable the liberal model on the one hand and the fascist-totalitarian one on the other.[39]

The implications of these arguments for North Americans are significant. Much of the literature on Latin America written during the 1950s and 1960s which pictured the area as either aspiring for or developing inevitably toward liberalism and democracy on the United States model would require rewriting.

39. The arguments are more fully elaborated in Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition"; Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America;* and Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World." Some parallel comments are offered in Edward J. Williams, *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967), pp. 266-71. The word "natural" is employed in the same sense that Frances FitzGerald uses it in her *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972) to refer to the habitual, *natural* mode of political response of the Vietnamese, a mode which the Americans no more understood than they apparently do that of Latin America.

Much of the developmentalist literature and its unilinear perspectives must be called into question; so must the presumption of a common, universal social science. The thrust of this article has been toward the identification of a distinct sociopolitical tradition and model that is closely attuned to the politico-cultural tradition of Iberia and Latin America and essential for understanding it, but which is not in accord with the major existing paradigms in the social sciences and in some respects represents an alternative to them. Corporatism and its related sociopolitical institutions and behavioral patterns are not just "problems to be overcome," as in so much of the development literature and U.S. aid programs, but living, operating realities that are intrinsically a part of the Iberic-Latin sociopolitical order and may well provide a viable alternative path to national modernization. This understanding may force North Americans to reexamine the bias and ethnocentrism of so many models used in the social sciences, to take Iberia and Latin America on their own terms rather than through the rose-colored glasses of North America, to bring area studies, understood as a cultural area rather than a geographic one, back into prominence in place of the often misleading and not very illuminating exercises in grand universal theorizing and cross-national comparison on a global basis, and to rethink some of the commonly accepted notions of the science of man.[40] This would be a healthy set of undertakings in any case, and if the study of corporatism helps to stimulate such rethinking, it will have served a useful purpose.

40. Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1958); Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds., *Social Structure and Political Theory* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974), pp. 16-39. For an especially significant macro-quantitative analysis based on a global sample that also points toward analysis by culture areas, see Philip B. Coulter, *Social Mobilization and Liberal Democracy: A Macro-Quantitative Analysis of Global and Regional Models* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975).